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Available online 16 April 2012AbstractBackground and goal: Relatively little is well known about the causes of emergency department (ED) adverse events/errors. The main purpose of
this study was to explore clinically significant adverse events (CSAEs), with an emphasis on those related to physicians’ factors, in discharged
patients of emergency medicine (EM) through an analysis of the basic management process.
Methods: We designed a retrospective study to determine CSAEs in the discharged patients of EM and explored these adverse events, based on
the basic management process. The collected cases were those who returned to the ED within 3 days, after being discharged directly from the
EM section (EMS), between February 1, 2002, and January 31, 2007. The basic management process includes history taking, physical
examinations, laboratory/radiological examinations, and observation. Our main outcome measurements were the inadequacies, their related
evidence, and their descriptive statistics (counts and proportions) in the basic management process in cases of CSAEs.
Results: Among the 101,402 patients discharged from the EMS, 1,230 [1.21%, 95% confidence interval (CI)¼ 1.03% e 1.39%] were determined
to have CSAEs. Among these 1,230 cases, physicians’ factors accounted for 722 (58.7%) and disease progress 508 (41.3%). The CSAEs rate
related to physicians’ factors was 0.7% (722/101,402, 95% CI¼ 0.69% e 0.75%). Regarding the causes of CSAEs related to physicians’ factors
(772), lack of observation was the most common (42.4%, 306/722), followed by the inadequacy in history taking (34.2%, 247/722). Only 8
(8/722, 1.1%) of the CSAEs were determined as being caused purely by “judgment defects”.
Conclusion: In this study, we found that 41.8% of CSAEs were due to disease process and 58.2% related to physicians’ factors in the discharged
patients of EM. Among CSAEs related to physicians’ factors, most were caused by inadequacies in basic management flow and only a small
minority was purely the result of “judgment defects”. After reviewing the related evidence with regards to these CSAEs, clusters of common
causes were noted.
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Patient safety has been one of the most important medical
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Building a Safer Health System”. Although a few reports
related to emergency department (ED) adverse events/medical
error have been published, relatively little is well known about
the cause of ED adverse events/errors.1e8 A few studies of
medical malpractice in ED cases were informative,1e4,6,7 but
reviewing medical adverse events had the shortcomings of
outcome biases and retrospective biases in retrospective
studies, especially in closed lawsuit cases, in which manyMedicine. Published by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
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for more data to be published about medical adverse events/
error for further analysis of their patterns and causes.10e12 Our
previous study showed that many of these adverse events were
due to inadequacies in the basic management process (history
taking, physical examinations, laboratory and radiological
examinations, and observation).13,14 Therefore, our main
purposes are to explore clinically significant adverse events
(CSAEs), with an emphasis on those related to physicians’
factors, through the analysis of the basic management process
and provide evidences for these insufficiencies in discharged
patients of emergency medicine (EM).
2. Methods2.1. Design and procedureThis is a 5-year structured retrospective case review study
to determine CSAEs in the discharged patients of EM and to
explore the causes of these adverse events through the analysis
of the basic management process. The basic management
process includes history taking, physical examinations, labo-
ratory/radiological tests, and observation of clinical symptoms
and treatment response. The collected cases were those who
returned to the ED after being discharged directly from the
EM section (EMS) within 3 days in a 5-year period. Two
senior emergency physicians (EPs) independently evaluated
the returned visit cases to determine if these cases had CSAEs
and the causes of the CSAEs. The “possible CSAEs” were
defined as major operative conditions, major medical condi-
tions, significant deterioration of clinical conditions, and
prolonged hospital stay (>3 days) in patients with returned
visits. After other causes of poor outcomes were excluded, the
causes of CSAEs would be “physicians’ factors” if we could
find clinical evidence of inadequacies in the basic manage-
ment process or definite physicians’ errors present, and the
causes would be considered as part of the “disease process” if
we could not find such evidence to be present. In CSAEs
related to physicians’ factors, the cause was considered to be
“judgment defects” if an error was definitely present and there
were no inadequacies in the basic management process. Main
outcome measures were inadequacies and their evidence in the
basic management process in CSAEs. This study was
approved by our institute review board (IRB).2.2. SettingThis study was conducted in a tertiary-care ED, with an
annual ED census of over 82,000 individuals, in a metropolis
in northern Taiwan. This ED provides a formal course with
regards to EM in their medical school and there is also
a formal EM training curriculum. In each shift of the ED
service, there are three to seven senior residents supervised by
two to four board-certified EPs. Most residents are EM resi-
dents, and some are from internal medicine, family medicine,
and the chest medicine department. In principle, EPs should
“sign out” all of the ED patients and provide on-siteimmediate consultation for any “difficult cases” in support of
these residents.2.3. Data collection and review processWe collected cases of returned visits within 3 days of ED
discharge between February 1, 2002 to January 31, 2007,
excluding trauma patients, pediatric patients, observation
room patients, and patients who had been hospitalized. We
considered the observation room patients were of a different
patient group, because they entered the observation room
through a formal process, were seen and evaluated by different
physicians, and had different times of stay and deposition. Our
reasons for choosing cases which were returned visits within 3
days of ED discharge were as follows. Firstly, most patients
that were returned visits had come back to the ED within 3
days.15 Secondly, cases that were returned visits within 3 days
of ED discharge included most cases of CSAEs, according to
the experience gained from our previous study.14 Thirdly, the
clinical correlation of two visits which spanned within 3 days,
was more easily examined.
We collected data and reviewed the cases of returned visits
in a systematic and structured way. Two assistants copied and
collected the related charts of the two visits, later becoming
the study file, and two EPs independently reviewed the files
and charts and evaluated the returned cases to determine if
the cases had CSAEs and the causes, in addition to deter-
mining if there was detailed evidence to support the presence
of CSAEs. In cases with disagreement, the two EPs met in
order to reach a consensus or consulted a third EP. In our
previous study, we had already got an acceptably high
agreement of CSAEs by two reviewers.14 “Possible CSAEs"
were defined as major operative conditions (e.g., perforated
abdominal hallow organs, appendicitis, intestinal obstruction,
cholecystitis, ischemic bowel disease), major medical condi-
tions (e.g., myocardial infarct, meningitis, pulmonary embo-
lism), significant deterioration of clinical conditions (e.g.,
development of sepsis, respiratory failure, or new deterioration
of neurological symptoms/signs, death), and/or prolonged
hospital stay (more than 3 days) in patients of returned
visits.14,16 All “adverse events” (with one or more components
of CSAEs) which occurred within 2 weeks after the 2nd visit,
and had a clinical correlation to the disease process of the two
visits, were included in the “possible CSAEs” list, which
needed a further analytic process to determine whether there
were CSAEs. However, to determine whether or not adverse
events are clinically significant is difficult and clinicians have
to try to distinguish adverse events from other causes of poor
outcome.17 For patients with poor outcome, other causes of
returned visits than CSAEs were determined by reviewers’
objective criteria. To clarify the terminology, the definitions of
all causes of poor outcome in patients with a returned visit
were determined in the pilot stage of the study (by reviewing
cases between January 1 and January 31, 2002) as described
below. “A different disease” meant there was a different
disease in the 2nd visit which was not clinically associated with
that of the first visit. “No need of hospitalization” was defined
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was expected to have no major adverse effect if patients were
not hospitalized. “The need of a regular treatment” meant
clinical conditions which needed regular procedures, such as
hernioplasty, urolithiasis needing a genitourinary procedure,
or psychological conditions needing further consultation or
medication adjustment. “Against-advise-discharge” meant
patients refused physicians’ suggestion of hospitalization and
signed a formal note. “Complications of diseases or proce-
dures” meant complications which were considered unex-
pected and not due to a procedural error. After the previously
mentioned causes were excluded, the causes of CSAEs would
be “physicians’ factors” if we could find clinical evidences of
inadequacies in the basic management process or definite
physicians’ errors, and the causes would be considered part of
the disease process if we could not (the analytic process
described below). When EPs had definite errors, but no
inadequacies in the basic management process were identified,
then the cause of CSAEs was defined as judgment defect. All
basic management involves making a judgment. In this study,
we emphasized the importance of the management process,
which includes history taking, physical examinations, appro-
priate tests and X-ray exams, and re-evaluation and observa-
tion, and considered completing this process as a basic
requirement of emergency physicians. Therefore, absence of
any one component in the process is not thought to be a “pure”
judgment error. “Disease process” is a common cause of
returned visits and is considered to be unexpected and not to
be the responsibility of physicians.2.4. The objective review process to determine CSAEs
and their causes, using evidence of inadequacies in the
basic management process as the guidelineThe objective review was done in a systematic way,
focusing on whether there were clinical evidences to indicate
inadequacies in the basic management process or definite
physicians’ errors. From our clinical experience and literature
review, we set a rational basic management process that
reflected a logical way of managing ED patients. The basic
management process includes history taking, physical exami-
nations, laboratory/radiological examinations, and observation
of clinical symptoms and treatment response.8,13,14,18,19 In the
review process, we followed the three guidelines in deter-
mining CSAEs:
1. An appropriate basic management process is a basic
requirement of EPs who see the ED patients. For EPs and
senior residents, an inadequacy in this process was
considered more likely to be “not done”, a neglect in the
basic requirement, and not purely to be “judgmental”.
2. CSAEs related to physicians’ factors were identified by
determining whether there were clinical evidences to
indicate insufficiencies in the basic management process
or definite physicians’ errors.
3. Evaluating the clinical evidence was done through
a systematic, sequential way. This meant an insufficiencyin the earlier part of the basic management process might
interfere in the latter processes, therefore the earlier
inadequacy was considered to be the basic cause, unless
multiple inadequacies were considered to be of equal
importance in the development of the CSAEs.
For CSAEs with inadequacies in each step of the basic
management process, we should find evidence of the insuffi-
ciencies. With regards to an appropriate history taking, EPs
should pay appropriate attention to patients’ complaints of
major risky symptoms and perform a system review to search
for these major risky symptoms. With regards to appropriate
physical examinations, EPs should perform appropriate
physical examinations under all clinical situations and detailed
special physical examinations under specific clinical situa-
tions. If later documentation proved that some parts of history
taking and physical examinations were critical for diagnosis or
management, then they were the main factors in the causes of
inadequacies. Appropriate laboratory/radiological examina-
tions included performing appropriate tests when indicated,
appropriate reading of radiological films, and appropriate
explanation of laboratory results. The appropriate conditions
needing observation of symptoms/signs and observation to
treatment were shown in our previous study.14
In our previous study, reliability was assessed by using the
“k statistic” for the reviewers’ determination of CSAEs and we
had already achieved an acceptable reliability and consensus
of selecting CSAEs.14 In this study, we also used the same
process to determine the reliability in selection of CSAEs/non-
CSAEs and of CSAEs related to physicians’ factors/disease
process.2.5. Outcome measurements and statistic methodsOur main outcome measurements were the inadequacies,
their evidences, and their descriptive statistics (counts and
proportions) in the basic management process in cases of
CSAEs due to physicians’ factors. All data were collected in
a spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel; Microsoft Corp., Redmond,
WA, USA).
3. Results
During the 5-year period, there were 258,431 EMS visits
and 101,402 patients discharged directly from the EMS. There
were 6,961 cases of returned visits and 1,230 cases of CSAEs.
Among the 6,961 cases of returned visits, we failed to extract
53 cases due to the unavailability of charts. The returned visit
rate was 6.69% (6961/101,402, 95% CI¼ 6.54% e 6.85%),
CSAEs rate was 1.21% (1230/101, 402, 95% CI 10.28% e
13.92%), and CSAEs rate related to physicians’ factors was
0.7% (722/101,402, 95% CI¼ 0.69% e 0.75%). Among
CSAEs related to physicians’ factors, lack of observation was
the most common (42.4%, 306/722), followed by inadequacy
in history taking (34.2%, 247/722). Only 8 (8/722, 1.1%) of
these events were determined as being caused purely by
“judgment defects”.
Table 1
The causes of poor outcome in ED discharged patients (n¼ 2115).
Causes of poor outcomes n %
Physicians’ factors 722 34.1
Disease progress 508 24
Need of regular procedures 299 14.1
No need of hospitalization 243 11.4
Different diseases 172 8.1
Patients’ factors (against-advice-discharge) 146 6.9
Complications of procedures 25 1.2
Table 3
Inadequacies in history taking (n¼ 247).
Neglect of major risky symptoms (n¼ 218)
Altered mental status 22
Chest pain 7
Dyspnea 29
Abdominal pain/gastrointestinal symptoms 40
Weakness/neurological symptoms 19
Fever 8
Headache 12
Prolonged fever (> 3 days) 78
Others 3
Lack of review of major risky symptoms and past history (n¼ 64)
Altered mental status 5
Chest pain 3
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CSAEs) (Table 1)Dyspnea 4
Abdominal pain/gastrointestinal symptoms 11
Weakness/neurological symptoms 10
Fever 11
Headache 1
Past history 19
Some patients had > one inadequacy.Among the 6,961 returned visit cases, 2,115 (30.4%) had
poor outcomes, defined as possible CSAEs, which meant
patients had one or more criteria of CSAEs after exploring
detailed patients’ situations, and 4,946 (69.6%) had mild
clinical conditions. Out of 2,115 cases of possible CSAEs,
1,230 cases were eventually analyzed for appropriateness of
the basic management process or physicians’ errors after we
excluded 885 cases in which there were different diseases, no
need of hospitalization, hospitalizations for regular proce-
dures, unexpected clinical complications, and purely patients’
factors. Among these 1,230 cases, physicians’ factors
accounted for 722 (58.7%) and disease progress 508 (41.3%).3.2. Analysis of the deficiencies in the basic management
process in CSAEs related to physicians’ factorsOnly 8 (1.1% in 722) cases with CSAEs related to physi-
cians’ factors had physicians’ errors, but could not be ascribed
to an inadequacy in the basic management process. Therefore,
they were considered to be caused purely by “judgment
defects”. In the 714/722 (98.9%) cases with CSAEs due to
physicians’ factors, inadequacies were found at least in one
step in the basic management process (Table 2) and their
detailed evidences of inadequacies will discussed in the next
paragraph. Inadequacies in history taking (247/722, 34.2%)
and inadequacies in patient observation (306/722, 42.4%)
were the most common.
Regarding the agreement of CSAEs and non-CSAEs
between the two reviewers, the k statistic was 0.61 (moderate
in reliability). Regarding the agreement of physicians’ factorsTable 2
The causes of clinically significant adverse events related to physicians’
factors (n¼ 722).
n %
Inadequacies in the basic management process (n¼ 714, 98.9%)
History taking 247 34.2
Physical examinations 60 8.3
Laboratory/radiological examinations 213 29.5
Observation of symptoms and observation
of response to treatment
306 42.4
“Pure” judgmental errors (n¼ 8, 1.1%) 8
Some patients had > one inadequacy.and disease process, the k statistic was 0.68 (moderate in
reliability).3.3. Evidence to support the presence of CSAE due to
physicians’ factors inadequacies in history takingInadequacies of history taking included two parts: neglect
of major risky symptoms and the lack of system review of
major risky symptoms.(Table 3). Among these, neglect of
fever for more than 3 days (78/722, 10.8%) and abdominal
pain/gastrointestinal symptoms (40/722, 5.5%) were the most
common in the first part and the lack of review of past history
(19/722, 2.6%) in the second part.3.4. Inadequacies in physical examinationsOnly a relatively small portion (60/722, 9%) of patients had
this inadequacy (Table 4). However, this did not mean other
patients with CSAEs related to physicians’ factors had no
problem in physical examinations. Because of the principle of
the evaluation process, some CSAEs with inadequacies in
physical examinations might be ascribed to inadequacies in
history taking.Table 4
Inadequacies in physical examinations (n¼ 60).
Types of inadequacies in physical examinations n
Fever 4
Neurological examinations 10
Heart murmur 4
Abdomen 12
Anal/genital region 5
Limbs (pulse and infection) 14
Vital signs (excluding fever) 9
Others 2
Table 6
Lack of observation of high-risk symptoms or clinical conditions (n¼ 306).
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examinations (Table 5)Clinical symptoms or conditions (n¼ 155)
Persistent abdominal pain 111
Persistent chest pain 6
Severe/persistent headache 3
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding 5
CVA/TIA/AMS 19
Intoxication 2
Syncope 4
Nonspecific 2
Others 3
Lack of observation to treatment response in high-risk condition (n¼ 151)Three types of these inadequacies were defined: no exam-
ination when indicated (84/722, 11.6%), inadequacies in
reading of radiological films (45/722, 6.2%), and inadequacies
in explanation of abnormal laboratory results (128/722,
17.7%). Among these categories, the absence of basic exam-
inations (42/722, 5.8%), inadequacies of plain abdomen film
reading (21/722, 2.9%) and neglect of high blood white cell
(>200,000/cumm) or high C-reactive protein (CRP >10 mg/
dL) (87/722, 12%) were the most common.Pneumonia 20
Cellulitis 14
Urinary tract infection 24
COPD/BA with acute exacerbation 19
Severe infectious diarrhea 103.6. The lack of observation of high-risk symptoms/
clinical conditions and the lack of observation of
response to treatment in high-risk conditions (Table 6)Infections in immunocompromized patients 50
Hypoglycemia/electrolyte imbalance 6
Others 8
AMS¼ altered mental status; BA¼ bronchial asthma; COPD¼ chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease; CVA¼ cerebrovascular attack; TIA¼ transient
ischemic attack.This group was the most common (306/722, 42.4%), and
patients in this group had persistent symptoms and high-risk
clinical conditions needing further clarification. Among
them, the lack of observation of clinical symptoms in patients
with persistent abdominal pain was the common clinical
condition (111/722, 15.4%). In the “lack of observation to
response to treatment” group, many patients with infectious
conditions needing treatment in the hospital or ED, especially
infections in immunocompromized conditions (50/722, 6.9%),
were discharged.
4. Discussion
In this study, the CSAEs rate was 1.21% (1,230/101, 402,
95% CI¼ 10.28% e 13.92%) and CSAEs rate related to
physicians’ factors was 0.7% (722/101,402, 95% CI 0.69% e
0.75%) in the discharged patients of EM. Most CSAEs relatedTable 5
Laboratory and radiological inadequacies (n¼ 213).
Inadequacies of laboratory examinations (n¼ 84)
Basic examinations 42
Liver function test 14
Chest X-ray, plain abdomen film 10
Electrocardiogram/cardiac enzyme 1
Ultrasound 13
Computerized tomography 2
Others 2
Inadequacies of radiological reading (n¼ 45)
Computerized tomography 5
Plain abdomen film 21
Chest pain 7
Ultrasound 11
Others 1
Inadequacies of explanation of abnormal laboratory results (n¼ 128)
Neglect of high white cell count and C-reactive protein level 87
Neglect of electrolyte imbalance (including blood sugar) 24
Neglect of abnormal renal function test 3
Neglect of abnormal electrocardiogram and cardiac enzyme level 0
Neglect of abnormal liver function tests 11
Others 3
Some patients had > one inadequacy.to physicians’ factors (98.9%) had inadequacies in the basic
management process and only a minority (1.1%) were deter-
mined to be caused purely by “judgment defects”. Inadequa-
cies of history taking (34.2%, 247/722) and the lack of
observation of high-risk clinical conditions and treatment
response in high-risk conditions (42.4%, 306/722), were the
most common. In this study, evidence present in the basic
management process to support adverse events revealed
clusters of common causes:
1. Lack of observation of patients with persistent abdominal
pain who were documented in charts (the most common)
(111/722, 15.8%)
2. Neglect of high white blood count/high CRP level (87/
722, 12%)
3. Neglect of prolonged fever (78/722, 10.8%)
4. Lack of observation to treatment in infections in immu-
nocompromized patients (50/722, 6.9%)
5. No basic examinations conducted when indicated (42/722,
5.8%)
6. Inadequacies in plain abdomen film reading (21/722, 2.9%)
7. Lack of review of past history (19/722, 2.6%)
Our results had several points agreeing with or in support of
previous studies. Firstly, our providing data of adverse events/
errors is an act advocated by the EM. Providing more data
relating to the medical error is an important issue in the EM.
Our data included a rate of CSAEs (also those related to
physicians’ factors), patterns of inadequacies, and evidence
(detailed analysis) of these inadequacies. There has been
scarce data related to understanding and examining medical
errors in the emergency medicine. Fordyce et al reported the
error rate was 18/100 registered patients and the significant
adverse event rate was 0.36/100 registered patients in the ED
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in adverse outcomes.5 Forster et al also reported a 6% adverse
event rate in ED discharged patients, but many of these were
mild events.8
Secondly, our results re-emphasized the importance of the
basic management process in preventing the adverse events/
errors. In our results, a high proportion of CSAEs related to
physicians’ factors had inadequacies in history taking and
testing. Previous studies have shown many adverse events or
errors occurred under the situations similar to our results:
oversimplified history taking and physical examinations,
inadequate laboratory testing and radiological examinations,
the incorrect reading of radiological films or breakdown in
diagnostic processes (history taking, physical exams, ordering
tests, and producing a follow-up plan).7,13,14 Additionally, one
of the most notable findings with our results was the high
proportion of the lack of observation of patients with persistent
abdominal pain in CSAEs related to physician factors (111/
722). Most of these cases were given diagnoses of minor
diseases (gastritis, peptic ulcer, dyspepsia, irritable bowel
syndrome, acute gastroenteritis and so on). Under these
“definite diagnoses”, premature closure and early discharge
were the rule. This inadequacy calls for the necessity of
observation of many patients. Our previous study also showed
that early discharging of high-risk patients without observation
or re-evaluation was a factor causing adverse events.14 Before
discharging a patient, EPs have to make sure of the
improvement of the patient symptoms. A serial follow-up is
frequently necessary in many ED clinical conditions to make
sure of the response and is also an important part in the ED
practice which has a high uncertainty.18
Our study had some points which were not specifically
mentioned by the previous studies. Firstly, we explored the
CSAEs (also those related to physicians’ factors) in ED dis-
charged patients through the basic management process
analysis using a systemic and sequential manner. The basic
management process is a logic approach to ED patients.
Through all the process, we try our best to make diagnoses,
search for serious conditions, and provide appropriate treat-
ment to patients. Evaluating the appropriateness of the basic
management process in patients of returned visits allows for
the audit criteria to become more clear-cut and concrete. In
this process, the forgotten parts of medical practice (history
taking and physical examinations) were re-emphasized and put
in the uppermost important part of the evaluation process.
Under appropriate history taking and physical examinations,
appropriate laboratory and radiological examinations then
could be ordered to support the impression derived from
history taking and physical examinations or search for other
high-risk conditions. However, uncertainty is still present in
many ED clinical conditions after initial evaluations, and EPs
need some time to clarify the situation. With these ideas in
mind, observation of high-risk symptoms and observation of
the treatment response of high-risk clinical conditions should
be necessary steps in making final decisions.
Secondly, under the review of the basic management
process, our data shows that more cases of poor outcomewould be explainable, with few causes ascribed to “judgment
defects”. That clear-cut evidence could be clearly defined and
more easily found, means that auditing the basic management
process is an efficient way of quality assessment. In evaluating
clinical adverse events/error, judgment is always considered
the cause, if we cannot find a definitive cause. When we check
these adverse events/errors through the basic management
process, in a systemic manner, a definitive cause is more easily
found and a pure judgment becomes a less occurred cause.
This would lead to fewer cases with poor outcomes being
“unexplainable”. From the quality control (QC) or quality
improvement (QI) perspective, we should see CSAEs related
to physicians’ factors with inadequacies in the basic
management process as a system problem. We should not put
the causes of many medical error or adverse events only
down to “judgment defects”, an individual approach in error
management process, when physicians’ factors or error are
definitely found. Because these inadequacies occur not only
in CSAEs related to physicians’ factors with inadequacies,
but also in many other ED patients, they should be seen as
a fundamental and system problem. According to the report
of Fordyce et al, only a portion of errors caused adverse
events and the majority of errors (> 98%) were uneventful.5
Latent conditions are inevitable “resident pathogens” within
the system. They can translate into error provoking condi-
tions and create long-lasting holes or weakness in the
defenses.20 If we take this into consideration, our 0.7%
adverse event rate means a nearly 70% occurrence of error in
all ED patient management. The real error rate is high but
unknown at this time. This means a system failure in the
physicians’ practice - a fundamental defect in the basic
management process.
Our study had some limitations which are worth noting.
Firstly, the selection of patients of a 3-day returned visit or
within, might miss cases of a returned visit after 3 days and
cases visiting other hospitals. However, we think the effect
might be mild and has been described in the “Methods”
section. Secondly, because of the retrospective nature of our
study, we might have problems in getting detailed information
in some cases to find more cases of CSAEs related to physi-
cians’ factors. In our previous study, identification of CSAEs
might be missed if the clinical data and documentation could
not provide adequate information to make the judgment.14
However, this possible increase of CSAEs related to physi-
cians’ factors cases might augment our results. Thirdly,
although we defined the CSAEs related to physicians’ factors,
we did not explore the real increase in damage in all cases.
Some cases of CSAEs related to physicians’ factors might just
follow their natural courses of diseases and should be
considered uneventful. However, the exploration of real
damage in every case was beyond our ability and would bring
more subjectivity.
In conclusion, our study showed most CSAEs related to
physicians’ factors had inadequacies in the basic management
process and only a minority were caused purely by judgment
defects. Evidence to support adverse events was found to have
a tendency of cause clustering. For EPs’ individual practice,
25C.-H. Chern et al. / Journal of Acute Medicine 2 (2012) 19e25EPs should evaluate the completeness of evaluation in the
basic management process of patients and evaluate the judg-
ment (through evidence that supports the diagnoses) before
discharging patients. From the system perspective, a basic
management process as a standardized guideline and its
auditing, should be advocated in the ED. The following of the
basic management process prospectively provides the poten-
tial prevention of errors/adverse events.References
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